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Introduction
This year has seen several significant changes affecting the rights of faculty members in
both private and public sector institutions. Most importantly, in Pacific Lutheran University (infra
at pg. 4 and 6) the NLRB modified the standards used to determine two important issues affecting
the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher education institutions to unionize under the
National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain institutions and their faculty members are
exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious activities; and second, whether certain
faculty members are managers, who are excluded from protection of the Act.
In addition, the NLRB published a decision allowing the use of employers' email systems
for union organizing (Purple Communications, infra at pg. 10). Finally, while the case addressing
whether graduate student assistants are employees under the NLRA was resolved by the parties
and therefore withdrawn (NYU, infra at pg. 6), this issue is under consideration in the Northwestern
University football players’ case. (Northwestern University, infra at pg. 8).
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court invalidated a number of NLRB decisions, finding that the
recess appointments in question were not valid, while preserving the ability of the President to
make recess appointments in certain circumstances. (Noel Canning, infra at pg. 2). While hundreds
of NLRB decisions were invalidated, in many of the cases, the Board has issued decisions largely
concordant with the prior Board rulings in the cases. (Infra at pg. 4).

1

This outline is an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of higher education cases of interest to this audience that have come
out over approximately the past twelve months. It is intended to provide general information, not binding legal
guidance. If you have a legal inquiry, you should consult an attorney in your state who can advise you on your specific
situation.
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This year was also an active one for cases involving the First Amendment Rights of public
sector faculty members. Most importantly, the Supreme Court ruled that a public employee’s
speech that may concern their job, but is not ordinarily within the scope of their duties, is subject
to First Amendment protection. (Lane, infra at pg. 12). The U.S. Supreme Court also declined
requests to radically alter agency fee law, but refused to allow the charging of agency fees to
certain “partial-public” employees. (Harris, infra at pg. 11). Finally, the Court found constitutional
amendments to the Michigan Constitution banning affirmative action. (Schuette, infra at pg. 21.)
Similarly, issues of importance to faculty have been decided by the appellate courts. The
federal appeals court for the Seventh Circuit dramatically expanded the scope of academic freedom
and expression for adjuncts and part-time faculty as well as full-time senior professors. (Mead,
infra at pg. 15). The Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized that speech related to scholarship or
teaching was not subject to the Garcetti job duties test, and is entitled to First Amendment
protection (Demers, infra at pg. 14). And the Second and Eleventh Circuits issued important
copyright decisions. (Authors Guild Inc., infra at 24, Cambridge University Press, infra at 22). In
the state courts, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that academic research is protected from
disclosure under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (ATI, infra at pg. 18); and the Kentucky
Supreme Court ruled that religious higher education institutions are not immune from suits to
enforce university handbooks (Kant, infra at pg. 19).

I.

Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues
A. NLRB Authority
1. Recess Appointments
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 189 L. Ed. 2d 538 (U.S. June 26, 2014)
On June 26, 2014, the U.S Supreme Court unanimously invalidated three appointments to
the NLRB because they did not meet the requirements of the Recess Appointments Clause.
The case arose when, in January 2012, President Obama filled three vacancies on the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) through recess appointments, after a Senate minority had
used the filibuster rule to block a Senate vote on the nominees. Under the Constitution’s Recess
Appointments Clause, “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of their
next Session.” U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 3. The three NLRB appointments preserved a quorum in
the agency, allowing it to conduct business. During this period, from December 17, 2011 to and
January 23, 2012, the Senate held pro forma sessions during which no business was conducted but
the Senate was not adjourned for more than three days. The President asserted that the Senate was
in recess despite these pro forma sessions, giving him authority to exercise his recess-appointment
power during this period.
Following these recess appointments, the NLRB issued a ruling that Noel Canning, a Pepsi
bottling firm in Washington State, illegally refused to enter a collective bargaining agreement with
2
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the Teamsters. The company filed a Petition for Review in the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, challenging the validity of the “recess” appointments, and thus the Board’s
quorum. A three-judge panel found that the recess appointments to the NLRB were
unconstitutional, and therefore it “could not lawfully act, as it did not have a quorum.” While Noel
Canning’s petition challenged the validity of using recess appointments during pro forma sessions
of the Senate, the D.C. Circuit issued a more sweeping decision, ruling that the President can only
exercise his recess appointment power during intersession recesses that occur between formal
sessions of Congress, and not during intrasession recesses that occur within a session of Congress,
despite long historical practice to the contrary. The Court further held that the President may only
use recess appointments for vacancies that arose during the recess, and not for positions that
became vacant while Congress was in session and remained vacant when a recess occurred. The
National Labor Relations Board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Supreme
Court agreed to take the case in June 2013.
The U.S Supreme Court unanimously invalidated three appointments to the NLRB because
they did not meet the requirements of the Recess Appointments Clause. However, the Court
divided by a vote of 5-4 on what types of recess appointments are permissible. The majority held
in its controlling opinion that recess appointments can be made during any recess of at least ten
days, regardless of whether the recess is an intersession recess or an intrasession recess and
regardless of when the vacancies being filled arose.
Justice Breyer explained: “The Recess Appointments Clause responds to a structural
difference between the Executive and Legislative Branches: The Executive Branch is perpetually
in operation, while the Legislature only acts in intervals separated by recesses. The purpose of the
Clause is to allow the Executive to continue operating while the Senate is unavailable. We believe
that the Clause’s text, standing alone, is ambiguous. It does not resolve whether the President may
make appointments during intra-session recesses, or whether he may fill pre-recess vacancies. But
the broader reading better serves the Clause’s structural function. Moreover, that broader reading
is reinforced by centuries of history, which we are hesitant to disturb. We thus hold that the
Constitution empowers the President to fill any existing vacancy during any recess—intra-session
or inter-session—of sufficient length.”
However, the Court invalidated the NLRB appointments at issue in the case because the
Senate had held “pro forma” sessions that broke a lengthy recess into smaller ones that were too
short for the recess appointment power to apply.
The concurring justices would have only permitted recess appointments during intersession
recesses and only when the vacancies arose during the same recess in which they would be filled.
Justice Scalia stated: “To prevent the President’s recess-appointment power from nullifying the
Senate’s role in the appointment process, the Constitution cabins that power in two significant
ways. First, it may be exercised only in ‘the Recess of the Senate,’ that is, the intermission between
two formal legislative sessions. Second, it may be used to fill only those vacancies that ‘happen
during the Recess,’ that is, offices that become vacant during that intermission. Both conditions
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are clear from the Constitution’s text and structure, and both were well understood at the
founding.”
There were roughly 430 cases decided by the Board with the invalid appointments.
Decisions of the Board during this period are technically invalid. However, many of these cases
have been settled or finalized and are therefore not affected by the Court’s decision. NLRB
spokesman Tony Wagner said the board has identified roughly 100 decisions that are still pending
and must be reviewed in the wake of the high court’s ruling.
Generally, after the Noel Canning decision was issued, the Board issued an order in many
of the pending cases setting aside the vacated Decision and Order, and retaining the case on its
docket for further action as appropriate. The Board has subsequently been addressing these cases
on an individual basis. In many of the cases, the Board has issued decisions largely concordant
with the prior Board rulings in the cases, adopting the reasoning of the vacated decisions, with
short summaries of the rationale in the original board decision.
For example in Grand Canyon Education, Inc. d/b/a Grand Canyon University, 28-CA022938, et al.; 362 NLRB No. 13 (February 2, 2015), the Board explained:
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning,
supra, we have considered de novo the judge’s decision and the record in light of
the exceptions and briefs. We have also considered the now-vacated Decision and
Order, and we agree with the rationale set forth therein. Accordingly, we affirm
the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and adopt the judge’s
recommended Order to the extent and for the reasons stated in the Decision
and Order reported at 359 NLRB No. 164, which is incorporated herein by
reference.
In addressing a specific finding, the Board highlighted the issue and adopted the reasoning
of the prior decision. “We agree with the analysis in the vacated Decision and Order regarding
Human Resources Business Partner Rhonda Pigati’s questioning of employee Gloria Johnson,
and we find that it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act for the reasons stated therein.”
2. Religiously Affiliated Institutions
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (December 16, 2014)
On Saturday, December 20, 2014, the National Labor Relations Board published a
significant decision involving the organizing rights of private-sector faculty members. In Pacific
Lutheran University, the Board modified the standards used to determine two important issues
affecting the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher education institutions to unionize
under the National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain institutions and their faculty
members are exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious activities; and second,
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whether certain faculty members are managers, who are excluded from protection of the Act. See
infra.
The question of whether faculty members in religious institutions are subject to jurisdiction
and coverage of the Act has long been a significant issue, with the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision
in Catholic Bishops serving as the foundation for any analysis. In Pacific Lutheran University,
the Board established a two-part test for determining jurisdiction. First, whether “as a threshold
matter, [the university] holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment”; and if
so, then, second, whether “it holds out the petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific
role in creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.”
The employer and its supporters argued that only the threshold question of whether the
university was a bona fide religious institution was relevant, in which case the Act would not apply
to any faculty members. The Board responded that this argument “overreaches because it focuses
solely on the nature of the institution, without considering whether the petitioned-for faculty
members act in support of the school’s religious mission.” Therefore, the Board established a
standard that examines whether faculty members play a role in supporting the school’s religious
environment.
In so doing, the Board recognized concerns that inquiry into faculty members’ individual
duties in religious institutions may involve examining the institution’s religious beliefs, which
could intrude on the institution’s First Amendment rights. To avoid this issue the new standard
focuses on what the institution “holds out” with respect to faculty members. The Board explained,
“We shall decline jurisdiction if the university ‘holds out’ its faculty members, in communications
to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large, as performing a
specific role in creating or maintaining the university’s religious purpose or mission.”
The Board also found that that faculty must be “held out as performing a specific religious
function,” such as integrating the institution’s religious teachings into coursework or engaging in
religious indoctrination (emphasis in original). This would not be satisfied by general statements
that faculty are to support religious goals, or that they must adhere to an institution’s commitment
to diversity or academic freedom.
Applying this standard, the Board found that while Pacific Lutheran University held itself
out as providing a religious educational environment, the petitioned-for faculty members were not
performing a specific religious function. Therefore, the Board asserted jurisdiction and turned to
the question of whether certain of the faculty members were managerial employees.
Following the issuance of the Pacific Lutheran University decision, the Board remanded a
number of cases involving whether to exercise jurisdiction over faculty members at self-identified
religious colleges and universities. In these cases, the Board generally explained:
the Board issued its decision in Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157
(2014), which specifically addressed the standard the Board will apply for
determining, in accordance with NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490 (1979), when we should decline to exercise jurisdiction over faculty members
5
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at self-identified religious colleges and universities. Accordingly, the Board
remands this proceeding to the Regional Director for further appropriate action
consistent with Pacific Lutheran University, including reopening the record, if
necessary. . . . [Note 2]. Members Miscimarra and Johnson stated that they adhere
to their dissenting view in Pacific Lutheran University, but nevertheless agree that
a remand is appropriate in this case.
Saint Xavier University, Case No. 13-RC-22025 (February 3, 2015). See also Islamic Saudi
Academy, Case No. 05-RC-080474 (February 26, 2015); Seattle University, Case No. 19-RC122863 (February 3, 2015); Manhattan College, Case No. 02-RC-023543 (February 3, 2015);
Duquesne University of the Holy Spirit, Case No. 06-RC-080933 (February 12, 2015).
The Regional Directors are issuing decisions based on these remands. For example, as the
National Center reported, on March 3, 2015, Regional Director Ronald K. Hooks issued a
supplemental decision and order in Seattle University, Case No. 19-RC-122863. In the decision,
Regional Director Hooks reexamined the evidence in the existing record based on the revised
standards and analysis in Pacific Lutheran University. The Regional Director concluded that while
the university demonstrated that it holds itself out as a Jesuit Catholic educational institution, it
failed to meet its burden of proving that it holds the petitioned-for contingent faculty members out
as performing a religious function. In support of his conclusion, the Regional Director referenced
the content of the faculty handbook, job postings, and faculty evaluation criteria. In addition, the
Regional Director cited to the lack of evidence in the record showing that faculty members are
required to serve as religious advisors, engage in religious training or conform with the institution's
religious tenets.

B. Faculty, Graduate Assistants and Players Coverage as Employees Entitled to
Collective Bargaining Representation
1. Faculty as Managers
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (December 16, 2014)
In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board also modified the standards used to determine
whether certain faculty members are managers, who are excluded from protection of the Act. This
question arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva, where the Court found that in certain
circumstances faculty may be considered “managers” who are excluded from the protections of
the Act. The Board noted that the application of Yeshiva previously involved an open-ended and
uncertain set of criteria for making decisions regarding whether faculty were managers. This led
to significant complications in determining whether the test was met and created uncertainty for
all of the parties.
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Further, in explaining the need for the new standard, the Board specifically highlighted, as
AAUP had in its amicus brief, the increasing corporatization of the university. The Board stated,
“Indeed our experience applying Yeshiva has generally shown that colleges and universities are
increasingly run by administrators, which has the effect of concentrating and centering authority
away from the faculty in a way that was contemplated in Yeshiva, but found not to exist at Yeshiva
University itself. Such considerations are relevant to our assessment of whether the faculty
constitute managerial employees.”
In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board sought to create a simpler framework for
determining whether faculty members served as managers. The Board explained that under the
new standard, “where a party asserts that university faculty are managerial employees, we will
examine the faculty’s participation in the following areas of decision making: academic programs,
enrollment management, finances, academic policy, and personnel policies and decisions.” The
Board will give greater weight to the first three areas, as these are “areas of policy making that
affect the university as whole.” The Board “will then determine, in the context of the university’s
decision making structure and the nature of the faculty’s employment relationship with the
university, whether the faculty actually control or make effective recommendation over those
areas. If they do, we will find that they are managerial employees and, therefore, excluded from
the Act’s protections.”
The Board emphasized that to be found managers, faculty must in fact have actual control
or make effective recommendations over policy areas. This requires that “the party asserting
managerial status must prove actual—rather than mere paper—authority. . . . A faculty handbook
may state that the faculty has authority over or responsibility for a particular decision-making area,
but it must be demonstrated that the faculty exercises such authority in fact.” Proof requires
“specific evidence or testimony regarding the nature and number of faculty decisions or
recommendations in a particular decision making area, and the subsequent review of those
decisions or recommendations, if any, by the university administration prior to implementation,
rather than mere conclusory assertions that decisions or recommendations are generally followed.”
Further, the Board used strong language in defining “effective” as meaning that “recommendations
must almost always be followed by the administration” or “routinely become operative without
independent review by the administration.
Following the issuance of the Pacific Lutheran University decision, the Board remanded a
number of cases involving whether faculty members are managers under Yeshiva. In these cases,
the Board generally explained:
On December 16, 2014, the Board issued its decision in Pacific Lutheran
University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014), which specifically addressed the standard
the Board will apply for determining, in accordance with NLRB v. Yeshiva
University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), when faculty members are managerial employees,
whose rights to engage in collective bargaining are not protected by the Act.
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Accordingly, the Board remands this proceeding to the Regional Director for
further appropriate action consistent with Pacific Lutheran University, including
reopening the record, if necessary. . . . [Note 2] Members Miscimarra and Johnson
adhere to their separate opinions in Pacific Lutheran University. Nevertheless, they
agree with their colleagues that a remand is appropriate.
Point Park University, Case No. 06-RC-01226 (February 25, 2015).2 See also Seattle University,
Case No. 19-RC-122863 (February 3, 2015).
The Regional Directors are issuing decisions based on these remands. For example, as the
National Center reported, on March 3, 2015, Regional Director Ronald K. Hooks issued a
supplemental decision and order in Seattle University. In the decision, Regional Director Hooks
reexamined the evidence in the existing record based on the revised standards and analysis in
Pacific Lutheran University. The Regional Director rejected the university's claim that the
contingent faculty were managerial, finding that they lack authority, or effective control
concerning the primary and secondary areas of decision making identified in Pacific Lutheran
University.
2. Graduate Assistants Right to Organize
Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), Case No. 13RC-121359 (March 26, 2014)
AAUP filed an amicus brief with the National Labor Relations Board arguing that graduate
assistants at private sector institutions should be considered employees with collective bargaining
rights. The Board invited amicus briefs in the Northwestern University football players case to
address several important issues, including whether the Board should modify or overrule its 2004
decision in Brown University, which found that graduate assistants were not employees and
therefore were not eligible for unionization. 342 NLRB 483 (2004). In the amicus brief the AAUP
argued that the Board should overrule the test of employee status applied in Brown to graduate
assistants, but did not take a position as to whether or not the unionization of college football
players was appropriate.

2

The Board in Point Park invited briefs from interested parties on the questions regarding whether university
faculty members seeking to be represented by a union are employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act
or excluded as managers. Point Park University, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 292 (May 22, 2012)(Invitation to file amicus
briefs). In Point Park AAUP submitted an amicus brief in July 2012, urging the NLRB to develop a legal definition
of employee status “in a manner that accurately reflects employment relationships in universities and colleges and
that respects the rights of college and university employees to exercise their rights to organize and engage in
collective bargaining.” This issue was instead addressed in Pacific Lutheran University and therefore the Board
remanded Point Park for further proceedings in light of the Pacific Lutheran decision. Point Park University, Case
No. 06-RC-01226 (February 25, 2015).
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This case arose when football players at Northwestern University sought to unionize. The
University argued that the football players were not “employees” under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) and therefore were not allowed to choose whether to be represented by a
union. The Regional Director for the Board had to determine whether players were “employees”
as defined by the NLRA. The Board normally applies the common law definition under which a
person who performs services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the other’s control or
right of control, and in return for payment, is an employee. The Regional Director found that
under this common law test, the football players were employees under the NLRA.
However, the University also argued that the football players were not employees under
the Board’s decision in Brown, in which the Board found that graduate assistants were not
employees and therefore had no right to unionize. The Regional Director responded that Brown
was inapplicable “because the players’ football-related duties are unrelated to their academic
studies unlike the graduate assistants whose teaching and research duties were inextricably related
to their graduate degree requirements.” Regional Director Decision at 18 citing Brown University,
342 NLRB 483 (2004). The Regional Director further found that even applying the test articulated
in Brown, the football players would be considered employees. Accordingly, the Regional Director
held that the scholarship football players are “employees” and therefore are entitled to choose
whether or not to be represented by a union for the purposes of collective-bargaining.
The University appealed to the National Labor Relations Board, and on April 24, 2014, the
Board granted the University’s request for review. On May 12, 2014 the Board issued a Notice
and Invitation to File Briefs inviting amici parties to address one or more of six questions. One of
the questions involved whether the Brown test, which impacts the bargaining rights of graduate
assistants and other student-employees, should be modified or overruled: "Insofar as the Board's
decision in Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004), maybe applicable to this case, should the
Board adhere to, modify, or overrule the test of employee status applied in that case, and if so, on
what basis?" Thus, while the Northwestern case involved football players, a Board decision to
modify or overrule Brown would significantly impact the rights of graduate assistants and other
similar student-employees.
AAUP had previously filed amicus briefs before the Board arguing that graduate assistants
should be granted collective bargaining rights. Since the issue was raised by the Board in the
Northwestern University case, AAUP filed an amicus brief arguing that the general rule
established in Brown, that the deprived graduate assistants of collective bargaining rights, should
be overruled. The brief explained
The policy reasons cited by the Brown University majority do not justify implying a special
“graduate student assistant” exception to the statutory definition of “employee.” Therefore,
the Board should overrule Brown University and return to its understanding that, where
“the fulfillment of the duties of a graduate assistant requires performance of work,
controlled by the Employer, and in exchange for consideration,” “the graduate assistants
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are statutory employees, notwithstanding that they simultaneously are enrolled as
students.” New York University, 332 NLRB 1205, 1207, 1209 (2000).
The amicus brief took particular issue with the argument that academic freedom justified depriving
graduate assistants of the right to unionize. As the brief argued,
At its core, the Brown University test of employee status is based on an erroneous
understanding of the relationship between academic freedom and collective bargaining. .
. . Indeed, interim developments provide further support for the notion that collective
bargaining is compatible with academic freedom. These include the NYU administration’s
decision to voluntarily recognize its graduate assistant union and a new research study that
is the first to provide a cross-campus comparison of how faculty-student relationships and
academic freedom fare at unionized and non-unionized campuses.
Therefore, the brief concluded that “the Board should overrule the test of employee status applied
in Brown University and return to its well-reasoned NYU decision, which found collective
bargaining by graduate assistants compatible with academic freedom.”
New York University v. GSOC/UAW, N.L.R.B. Case No.: 02-RC-023481; Polytechnic
Institute of New York University v. International Union, United Automobile Aerospace,
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), N.L.R.B. Case No.: 29-RC012054
These cases addressed the question of whether are employees who have collective
bargaining rights, but were rendered moot and withdrawn as the parties settled based on an
agreement to allow a vote by the graduate assistants on whether to organize with the UAW.
C.

Employee Rights to Use Email

Purple Communications, 361 NLRB No. 126 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 11, 2014)
The National Labor Relations Board recently issued a decision significantly expanding the
right of employees to use their employers' e-mail systems for union organizing and other activities
protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
In Purple Communications the board explained that “the use of email as a common form
of workplace communication has expanded dramatically in recent years.” Therefore the board
ruled that “employee use of email for statutorily protected communications on nonworking time
must presumptively be permitted by employers who have chosen to give employees access to their
email systems.” While the case addressed communications supporting the union during an
organizing drive, given the board's expansion of protected activity, this also includes
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communications critical of the employer's employment-related policies, practices and management
decisions.
Therefore, employees who are given access to their employer’s e-mail system for business
purposes now will be able to use that system on non-working time to engage in a wide range of
protected communications, including union support and comments critical of the employer's
employment-related policies and management decisions. While the board did not directly address
other types of electronic equipment and communications, such as instant messaging or texting
from employer-owned smartphones and other devices, the board noted that a similar analysis
would potentially apply.
However, there are limitations to the decision. First, since the decision was issued by the
NLRB, under the statute protecting private-sector employees, it only applies to private-sector
employees. Second, the board only addressed employee use of work e-mail, and did not extend the
protection to cover use by non-employees. Third, the protected use was limited to non-work time,
and absent discrimination against the union it does not give the employees right to use the work email during work time. Fourth, the employer may in certain limited circumstances prohibit or limit
the use of work e-mail on non-work time. Finally, this ruling will likely be appealed and could be
overturned by the courts.
Nonetheless, this is a major step forward for the rights of faculty members in private
institutions. E-mail is one of the primary ways in which faculty speak to each other in the modern
world. The ability to use email to communicate is essential to faculty, particularly contingent
faculty, who are often dispersed and may not be able to speak directly to each other regularly. This
decision recognizes this reality and provides private-sector faculty members’ use of work email to
communicate with each other about union matters will be protected.
D. Agency Fee
Harris v. Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014)
On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its much awaited decision in the Harris case
in which the plaintiffs requested that the Court rule unconstitutional the charging of agency fees
in the public sector. The Court rejected these attempts to alter the agency fee jurisprudence as it
has existed in the public sector for over 35 years since the Court issued its seminal decision in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Here, in a 5 to 4 opinion issued by
Justice Alito, the Court questioned the foundation of Abood, but specifically stated that it was
unnecessary for the Court to reach the argument that Abood should be overruled. Instead, the
Court ruled that agency fees could not be imposed on certain “partial-public” employees, a
category that likely has little applicability to faculty members at public institutions.
In its decision the Court focused on the unique employment status of the individuals in
question, who were personal assistants providing homecare services to Medicaid recipients. While
the state compensated the individuals, the majority noted that the employer was normally
considered the person receiving the care and that the government had little role in the individuals’
11
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employment. It also noted that the state classified the individuals as state employees “solely for
the purpose” of being covered by the state labor law but did not consider them state employees
“for any other purpose.” Accordingly, the Court held that these individuals were not “full-fledged
public employees” but were instead “partial-public or quasi-public employees.” The majority then
held that the authorization to charge agency fees under Abood did not extend to such employees
and the imposition of agency fees could not be justified under other First Amendment principles.
However, as the dissent explained, “[s]ave for an unfortunate hiving off of ostensibly ‘partialpublic’ employees, Abood remains the law.” Because the ruling applied only to “partial-public
employees,” it is unlikely to have a significant impact on agency fee jurisprudence applicable to
faculty members at public institutions.
However, there are some disturbing undercurrents in the decision. First, the five justice
majority clearly questions the rationale supporting Abood, and it did not reaffirm Abood and Justice
Alito has all but invited further challenges to Abood in general. Second, the Court created a new
category of “partial-public employees.” This category, while not well defined, would seem to have
limited application to current faculty members, whether on full-time, part-time or on contingent
appointments. However, there could be attempts to create such “partial-public” employees as a
result of this decision. Third, the Court raised the issue of the scope of bargaining as supporting
agency fee under Abood. This could lead to some confusion regarding Abood in situations where
bargaining rights are limited. Fourth, the case illustrates the danger in creating special classes of
“employees,” whether the classes are created in the interests of unions or by employers seeking to
avoid the application of certain laws.

II.

First Amendment and Speech Rights for Faculty and other Academic Professionals
Lane v. Franks, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312 (U.S. 2014)
In this Supreme Court case the Court held unanimously that a public employee’s speech
that may concern their job, but is not ordinarily within the scope of their duties, is subject to First
Amendment protection. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Lane did not speak
as a citizen when he was subpoena’d to testify in a criminal case, finding that Eleventh Circuit
relied on too broad a reading of Garcetti. Garcetti does not transform citizen speech into employee
speech simply because the speech involves subject matter acquired in the course of employment.
The crucial component of Garcetti then, is, whether the speech “is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”
Edward Lane was the director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY), a
program operated by Central Alabama Community College (CACC). Lane in the course of his
duties as director conducted an audit of the program’s expenses and discovered that Suzanne
Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative who was on CITY’s payroll, had not been reporting for
work. As a result Lane terminated Schmitz’ employment. Federal authorities soon indicted
Schmitz on charges of mail fraud and theft. Lane was subpoenaed and testified regarding the events
12
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that led to the termination of Schmitz at CITY. Schmitz was later convicted. Steve Franks, then
CACC’s president, terminated Lane along with 28 other employees under the auspices of financial
difficulties. Soon afterward, however, “Franks rescinded all but 2 of the 29 terminations—those
of Lane and one other employee”. Lane sued alleging that Franks had violated the First
Amendment by firing him in retaliation for testifying against Schmitz.
The District Court granted Franks’ motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that the
individual-capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity and the official-capacity claims
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed, holding
that Lane spoke as an employee, not a citizen, because he acted in accordance to his official duties
when he investigated and terminated Schmitz’ employment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of
Appeals as to “whether public employees may be fired—or suffer other adverse employment
consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary
job responsibilities”.
The Court held that Lane’s speech was entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court
explained that under Garcetti, the initial inquiry was into whether the case involved speech as a
citizen, which may trigger First Amendment protection, or speech as an employee, which would
not trigger such protection. In Lane the Court provided a more detailed explanation of employee
versus citizen speech, and expanded the range of speech that is protected. The Court explained that
“the mere fact that a citizen's speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public
employment does not transform that speech into employee--rather than citizen--speech. The
critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee's duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” And the Court found that
“Lane’s sworn testimony is speech as a citizen.”
The Court further determined that Lane’s speech was protected under the First
Amendment. First, Lane’s speech about the corruption of a public program is “obviously” a matter
of public concern and further that testimony within a judicial proceeding is a “quintessential
example” of citizen speech. Second, the employer could not demonstrate any interest in limiting
this speech to promote the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees or
“that Lane unnecessarily disclosed sensitive, confidential, or privileged information”.
The Court held that Franks could not be sued in his individual capacity on the basis of
qualified immunity. Under that doctrine, courts should not award damages against a government
official in their personal capacity unless “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,”
and “the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Because of the
ambiguity of Eleventh Circuit precedent at the time of the conduct, the right was not “clearly
established” and thus the test unsatisfied to defeat qualified immunity. Lane’s speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection, but Franks is entitled to qualified immunity. As a result of this case
the right is clearly established and is now the standard.
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Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. Wash. Jan. 29, 2014)(Important note, previous
opinion dated September 4, 2013 and published at 729 F.3d 1011 was withdrawn and
substituted with this opinion.)(First Amendment protection for faculty speech critical of
the employer)
In this important decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinforced the
First Amendment protections for academic speech by faculty members. Adopting an approach
advanced in AAUP’s amicus brief, the court emphasized the seminal importance of academic
speech. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Garcetti analysis did not apply to "speech
related to scholarship or teaching,” and therefore the First Amendment could protect this speech
even when undertaken "pursuant to the official duties" of a teacher and professor.
Professor Demers became a faculty member at Washington State University (WSU) WSU
in 1996 and he obtained tenure in 1999. Demers taught journalism and mass communications
studies at the university in the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication. Starting in 2008,
Demers took issue with certain practices and policies of the School of Communication. Demers
began to voice his criticism of the college and authored two publications entitled 7-Step Plan for
Improving the Quality of the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication and The Ivory Tower
of Babel. Demers sued the university and claimed that the university retaliated against him by
lowering his rating in his annual performance evaluations and subjected him to an unwarranted
internal audit in response to his open criticisms of administration decisions and because of his
publications.
The district court dismissed Demers’ First Amendment claim on the ground that Demers
made his comments in connection with his duties as a faculty member. Unlike most recent cases
involving free speech infringement at public universities, the district court’s analysis did not center
on the language from Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Instead, the court applied a five
part test set out by the Ninth Circuit in a series of public employee speech cases and found that
Demers was not speaking as a private citizen on matters of public concern. Therefore, the district
court found his speech was not protected by the First Amendment.
Demers appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The AAUP joined with the Thomas Jefferson Center
for the Protection of Free Expression to file an amicus brief in support of Demers. The amicus
brief argued that academic speech was not governed by the Garcetti analysis, but instead was
governed by the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 US 563
(1968). In two opinions, the Ninth Circuit agreed and issued a ruling that vigorously affirmed that
the First Amendment protects the academic speech of faculty members.
In an initial opinion issued on September 4, 2013, the Ninth Circuit held that Garcetti did
not apply to “teaching and writing on academic matters by teachers employed by the state,” even
when undertaken "pursuant to the official duties" of a teacher or professor. Demers v. Austin, 729
F.3d 1011 (September 4, 2013). Instead, as argued in the amicus brief, the court held that academic
employee speech on such matters was protected under the Pickering balancing test. The court
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found that the pamphlet prepared by Demers was protected as it addressed a matter of public
concern but remanded the case for further proceedings. The University filed a petition for panel
rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc.
On January 29, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion
denying the petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc and withdrawing
and modifying its previous opinion. Originally, the court held that "teaching and writing on
academic matters" by publicly-employed teachers could be protected by the First Amendment
because they are governed by Pickering v. Board of Education, not by Garcetti v. Ceballos. In its
2014 superseding opinion, the Ninth Circuit expanded that ruling to hold that Garcetti does not
apply to "speech related to scholarship or teaching" and reaffirmed that “Garcetti does not –
indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot – apply to teaching and academic writing that
are performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.”
The Ninth Circuit held specifically that the 7-Step plan was “related to scholarship or
teaching” within the meaning of Garcetti because “it was a proposal to implement a change at the
Murrow School that, if implemented, would have substantially altered the nature of what was
taught at the school, as well as the composition of the faculty that would teach it.” The court thus
considered whether the Demers pamphlet was protected under the Pickering balancing test.
Academic employee speech is protected under the First Amendment by the Pickering analysis if
it is a (1) matter of public concern, and (2) outweighs the interest of the state in promoting
efficiency of service. The court held that the pamphlet addressed a matter of “public concern”
within the meaning of Pickering because it was broadly distributed and “contained serious
suggestions about the future course of an important department of WSU.” The case was remanded
to the district court, however, to determine (1) whether WSU had a “sufficient interest in
controlling” the circulation of the plan, (2) whether the circulation was a “substantial motivating
factor in any adverse employment action, and (3) whether the University would have taken the
action in the absence of protected speech.
Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. College, 770 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. Ill. 2014)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (based in Chicago) dramatically
expanded the scope of academic freedom and expression for adjuncts and part-time faculty as
well as full-time senior professors. This quite unexpected (and unanimous) ruling
greatly enhanced recently established constitutional protection for outspoken critics of public
college and university administrators. It reinforced and enhanced recent and congenial decisions
in two other federal circuits in cases from Washington (Demers) and North Carolina (Adams).
The court specifically relied on a sympathetic view of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the
Garcetti case, expressly invoking the justices’ “reservation” of free speech and press protections
for academic speakers and writers. The three-judge panel unanimously declared that an Illinois
community college could not summarily dismiss an adjunct teacher for criticizing the
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administration, at least as long as the issues she had raised publicly and visibly constituted
“matters of public concern.”
The federal appeals court also noted that even a contingent or part-time teacher had a
reasonable expectation of continuing employment at the institution. The appellate court for the
Seventh Circuit ruled in a sympathetic opinion that Robin Meade, the outspoken critic and active
union officer, was “not alone in expressing concern about the treatment of adjuncts.” The panel
added that “colleges and universities across the country are targets of increasing coverage and
criticism regarding their use of adjunct faculty.” In this regard, the court broke important
new ground not only with regard to academic freedom and professorial free expression, but even
more strikingly in its novel embrace of the needs and interests of adjuncts and part-timers.
Benison v. Ross, 765 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. Mich. 2014)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that retaliation against a faculty
member as a result of her husband’s activity could be protected under the First Amendment.
Kathleen Benison was a tenured professor of geology at Central Michigan University ("CMU").
In 2011, Kathleen's husband Christopher Benison, an under-graduate student at CMU, sponsored
a vote of no confidence in the president and provost of the university. Subsequently, the Geology
Department refused a salary supplement to Kathleen, a tenured professor of geology at the
University who had previously been approved to take a 2012 spring semester sabbatical. Kathleen
then resigned from her position and refused to repay the compensation and benefits that she had
received during the sabbatical, which included her husband's tuition. The University filed suit
against her, claiming that Kathleen had breached her commitment to return to the University after
her sabbatical. The Benisons filed suit alleging that the president of CMU, and the provost and
dean, retaliated against them because of Christopher's sponsorship of the no-confidence resolution.
The Sixth Circuit found sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether CMU filed a lawsuit against Kathleen Benison and placed a hold on Christopher Benison's
transcript in retaliation for Christopher's exercise of his First Amendment rights.
Frieder v. Morehead State Univ., 770 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. Ky. 2014)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a ruling in favor of defendant,
Morehead State University. Frieder was a tenure-track professor at the University who was
evaluated for tenure based on three factors: teaching, professional achievement, and service to the
university. His evaluations for professional achievement and service to the university were
excellent but reviews of his teaching abilities were "abysmal." After being denied tenure, Frieder
sued claiming that the University retaliated against his exercise of free speech. Frieder argued that
his evaluators retaliated against his "idiosyncratic teaching methods," which allegedly involved
“context appropriate uses of the middle finger.” The court concluded that Frieder's First
Amendment claim failed because he did not show any connection between the tenure decision and
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his exercise of free speech. The court explained, “Even if we assume for the sake of argument and
against our better judgment that the Constitution protects Frieder's one-finger salute in this
instance, a free speech retaliation claim still requires retaliation--a showing that his gesture
motivated the university's tenure decision.”
A. Other Recent First Amendment Cases
Golembiewski v. Logie, 516 Fed. Appx. 476 (6th Cir. May 27, 2013) (not recommended
for publication), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 213 (2013), rehearing denied, 134 S. Ct. 816
(2013)
A state university employee's petition to rescind her university's employee- attendance
policy was an employee grievance concerning internal office policy. Thus, it was not a matter of
public concern upon which the employee could base a claim that she was terminated in violation
of her First Amendment right to free speech. This was true although the employee submitted her
petition to a state employment board and the petition was related union related.
Palmer v. Penfield Central School District, 918 F. Supp. 2d 192 (W.D.N.Y. 2013)
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York found that an elementary
school teacher’s complaint that her school district discriminates against African American students
was not protected speech under the First Amendment. Noting that the teacher’s statements (i) were
made during a mandatory grade-level meeting and (ii) were “related to a matter that was directly
connected to, and arose out of, her duties as a teacher,” the court held that the teacher did not speak
as a citizen on a matter of public concern. As a result, the teacher’s speech was not protected from
discipline from the school district.
Garvin v. Detroit Board of Education, 2013 Mich. App. LEXIS 391 (Mich. Ct. App.
2013) appeal denied 494 Mich. 883 (Mich. 2013)
A Michigan Court of Appeals held that a public school teacher’s speech, made in the form
of a report of student sexual assault to Child Protective Services, was protected by the First
Amendment. Finding that (i) the speech involved a matter of public concern, (ii) the speech was
not made by the teacher in her professional capacity, and (iii) “the societal interests advanced by
[the] speech outweighed the [school district’s] interests in operating efficiently and effectively,”
the court held that the First Amendment protected the teacher from retaliation stemming from her
speech.
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III.

FOIA/Subpoenas and Academic Freedom
The American Tradition Institute and Honorable Delegate Robert Marshall v. Rector
& Visitors of the University of Virginia & Michael Mann, 756 S.E.2d 435 (Va. 2014)
In this case the Virginia Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a professor’s climate
research records were exempt from disclosure under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act as
academic research records. The Court explained that the exclusion of University research records
from disclosure was intended to prevent “harm to university-wide research efforts, damage to
faculty recruitment and retention, undermining of faculty expectations of privacy and
confidentiality, and impairment of free thought and expression.” While the decision was limited
to a Virginia statute, it provided a strong rationale for the defense of academic records from
disclosure.
The case began in 2011, when the American Tradition Institute served a FOI request on
the University of Virginia regarding Professor Michael Mann’s climate research. This request
mirrored the subpoena previously served on the University by Attorney General Cuccinelli. The
University supplied some records, but took the position that the majority of the records were not
subject to public disclosures. Thereafter, ATI petitioned to compel the production of these
documents. Professor Michael Mann sought to intervene, arguing that the emails in question were
his and therefore he should have standing in any litigation relevant to any document release. AAUP
submitted a letter to the trial court, the 31st Judicial Circuit Court of Virginia, in support of Mann’s
intervention, and the court granted him standing.
AAUP and the Union of Concerned Scientists subsequently filed a joint amicus brief with
the Circuit Court. On April 2, 2013 the Circuit Court held that all of the records sought by
petitioners qualified for exclusion under the Virginia FOIA exemption for “data, records or
information of a proprietary nature produced or collected by or for faculty of staff of public
institutions of higher education….. in the conduct of or as a result of study or research on medical,
scientific or scholarly issues, whether sponsored by the institution alone or in conjunction with a
governmental body, where such data, records or information has not been publicly released,
copyrighted or patented” or under the exemption for personnel records. The court also ruled that
purely personal email messages are not public records under the Virginia FOIA.
The Virginia Supreme Court granted a petition for review and the AAUP, in partnership
with the Union of Concerned Scientists, filed a brief with the court supporting Professor Mann and
UVA and arguing that granting access to the private materials would have a severe chilling effect
on scientists and other scholars and researchers. The brief urged that “in evaluating disclosure
under FOIA, the public’s right to know must be balanced against the significant risk of chilling
academic freedom that FOIA requests may pose.” The brief also argued that enforcement of broad
FOIA requests that seek correspondence with other academics, as ATI sought here, “will
invariably chill intellectual debate among researchers and scientists.” Also, exposing researchers’
“initial thoughts, suspicions, and hypotheses” to public scrutiny would “inhibit researchers from
speaking freely with colleagues, with no discernible countervailing benefit.”
18
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In April 2014, the Virginia Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision upholding the trial
court’s decision that none of the requested records were subject to disclosure. The primary issue
was whether the research records were “proprietary” under the statute. The Court found that the
legislature wanted to ensure that public universities were not at a competitive disadvantage in
relation to private universities. The Court noted that this applied not only to financial injury, but
also to “undermining of faculty expectations of privacy and confidentiality, and impairment of free
thought and expression.” The Court also cited the numerous affidavits attesting to the harmful
nature of the disclosures, quoting extensively from one that discussed the threats to possible
collaborations with faculty at public institutions. Therefore, the Court found that the term
proprietary was intended to have a broad definition that resulted in the exclusion from disclosure
of the requested research material.

IV.

Tenure, Due Process, and Breach of Contract
A. Tenure – Breach of Contract
Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2014); and Kirby v.
Lexington Theol. Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014)

The Kentucky Supreme Court recently issued two decisions strongly affirming the rights
of tenured faculty members at religious institutions and echoing arguments made by AAUP in an
amicus brief filed with the court. In two companion cases the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that
religious institutions are generally bound by tenure contracts, including faculty handbooks, and
that faculty members may sue if these contracts are breached, even in some instances in which the
faculty member is a minister.
One of the two cases involved Laurence Kant, a tenured Professor of Religious Studies at
Lexington Theological Seminary, which employed him to teach courses on several religious and
historical subjects. In 2009, the Seminary terminated Kant’s employment in violation of the terms
of the Faculty Handbook. Kant challenged his termination by filing suit for breach of contract and
breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. Similarly, the Seminary terminated
Professor Jimmy Kirby, who filed suit for breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing,
and for race discrimination in violation of Kentucky law. Two trial courts summarily dismissed
Kant's and Kirby’s claims, holding that the contract claims were barred by the “ministerial
exception”—a judicially created "principle whereby the secular courts have no competence to
review the employment-related claims of ministers against their employing faith communities[.]"
Kirby at * 11. The lower courts also held that they had no jurisdiction to interpret the contract
under the “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine,” under which "the secular courts have no jurisdiction
over ecclesiastical controversies and . . . will not interfere with religious judicature or with any
decision of a church tribunal relating to its internal affairs, as in matters of discipline or excision,
or of purely ecclesiastical cognizance." Kirby at * 53. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed
the decisions below and both professors filed separate appeals with the Kentucky Supreme Court.
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AAUP filed an amicus brief in support of Kant’s appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court,
arguing that the Seminary could not use the ministerial exception to avoid its voluntarily negotiated
tenure contract obligations. Specifically, AAUP argued that the issue at the heart of the case—
whether the contract permitted the Seminary to eliminate tenure and terminate Kant due to
financial exigency—could be decided based on “neutral principles of law” that would not require
the Court to interfere with the Seminary’s constitutional right to select its own ministers or
otherwise to intrude on matters of church doctrine. While the Court did not formally join the Kant
and Kirby cases, it heard arguments on the same day and relied upon the arguments in AAUP’s
amicus brief in reaching its decision in both Kirby and Kant.
On April 17, 2014, the Kentucky Supreme Court issued unanimous decisions in both cases.
Although the Court adopted the ministerial exception doctrine as outlined by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012),
it flatly rejected the reasoning of the Kentucky courts below and permitted both professors to
proceed with their cases. The Court viewed the ministerial exception as narrow, contrary to the
expansive interpretation offered by Seminary. In particular, the Court stated “We reject a
categorical application of the ministerial exception that would treat all seminary professors as
ministers under the law.” Kant at *2-3. Instead, the Court emphasized that the “primary focus
under the law is on the nature of the particular employee's work for the religious institution.” Kant
at *22. Accordingly, the court found that Kant was not a minister, because he taught history of
religion, a primarily secular field. The court concluded that “When an employee operates in a nonministerial capacity . . . the employee should be entitled to full legal redress. As a result, the
ministerial exception does not bar Kant's contractual claims.” Kant at *23.
The court explicitly stated that neither the ministerial exception nor the related
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine would preclude claims where employees, and even ministers
(like Kirby), sought to enforce contractual rights not involving an interpretation of church doctrine.
In language echoing AAUP’s amicus brief, the court explained:
"[W]hen the case merely involves a church, or even a minister, but does not require the
interpretation of actual church doctrine, courts need not invoke the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine." Indeed, if "neutral principles of law" or "objective, well-established concepts . .
. familiar to lawyers and judges" may be applied, the case—on its face—presents no
constitutional infirmity. Of course, neutral principles of law can be applied to the breach
of contract claim presented in the instant case; but, more importantly, Kant's claim involves
no consideration of or entanglement in church doctrine. We reiterate that the intent of
ecclesiastical abstention is not to render "civil and property rights . . . unenforceable in the
civil court simply because the parties involved might be the church and members, officers,
or the ministry of the church."
Kant at *24-25.
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V.

Discrimination and Affirmative Action
A. Affirmative Action in Admissions
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 188 L. Ed. 2d 613 (2014)

In this case the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a lower court ruling that had found
unconstitutional provisions of an amendment to the Michigan Constitution banning affirmative
action affecting Michigan's public higher education institutions. The issue was whether the
Michigan amendment distorts the political process against racial and ethnic minority voters in
Michigan, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
Court noted that the question was ". . . not the permissibility of race-conscious admissions policies
under the Constitution but whether, and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit
the consideration of racial preferences in governmental decisions, in particular with respect to
school admissions." The Court held that because there was no specific injury, voters had the right
to determine whether race-based preferences should be permitted by state entities and therefore
the amendment banning affirmative action was constitutional. The Court made clear, however,
that this ruling does not change the principle outlined in Fisher v. University of Texas that, "the
consideration of race in admissions is permissible, provided that certain conditions are met."
The AAUP joined a coalition brief, authored by American Council on Education and joined
by 47 other higher education related organizations, which was submitted on August 30, 2013. The
brief argued that while Schuette and his supporting amici raise policy questions about the
educational benefits of racially diverse student enrollments and offer commentary on the methods
they believe colleges and universities should employ to attain diversity, the constitutionality of the
pursuit of racial diversity in higher education is not at issue in this case.
The brief explained that the constraints Schuette and his amici supporters propose on the
lawful tools by which colleges and universities may attain diversity are at odds with the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Fisher v. Texas and Grutter v. Bollinger and the “longstanding… tradition of
governmental forbearance in higher education.” Further, that “whether and how, within the bounds
of the Equal Protection Clause, to pursue the educational benefits of a diverse student body are
questions of academic policy and practice properly assigned to the judgment of colleges and
universities.” The brief reiterated the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter, in which it endorsed
“deference to institutional judgment that student diversity is a compelling interest, reasoning that
those responsible for higher education are best qualified to evaluate the cumulative information –
related, for instance, to campus dynamics, cognitive processes, nurturance of moral reasoning, and
pursuit of the institution’s particular educational mission –necessary to make that judgment.” The
brief admonished that courts and States should “resist substitut[ing] their own notions of sound
educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review,” and concludes that
“overrid[ing] those academic judgments by State constitutional amendment would truncate
educators’ traditional authority, an authority that educators have exercised to the immense benefit
of this nation from the nation’s beginnings to the present day.”
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On April 22, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision overturning the appellate court
decision and finding the ban on affirmative action constitutional. The Court took pains to note that
it was not ruling on the constitutionality of affirmative action itself. The Court explained. “Before
the Court addresses the question presented, it is important to note what this case is not about. It is
not about the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher
education. The consideration of race in admissions presents complex questions, in part addressed
last Term in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U. S. ---, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 186 L. Ed. 2d
474 (2013). In Fisher, the Court did not disturb the principle that the consideration of race in
admissions is permissible, provided that certain conditions are met. In this case, as in Fisher, that
principle is not challenged. The question here concerns not the permissibility of race-conscious
admissions policies under the Constitution but whether, and in what manner, voters in the States
may choose to prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in governmental decisions, in
particular with respect to school admissions.”
The Court proceeded to find that the amendment to the Michigan Constitution was itself
constitutional. In doing so the Court found that because there was no specific injury, voters had
the right to determine whether race-based preferences should be permitted by state entities and
therefore the amendment banning affirmative action was constitutional. The opinion of the Court
concluded, “This case is not about how the debate about racial preferences should be resolved. It
is about who may resolve it. There is no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this
Court's precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy
determination to the voters.”

VI.

Intellectual Property
A. Patent and Copyright Cases
Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. Ga. 2014)

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision analyzing the copyright fair use
doctrine and the fair use four prong test. This case concerns the use at Georgia State University
(GSU) of electronic course reserves and electronic course sites to make excerpts from academic
books available online to students enrolled in particular courses. The named plaintiffs in the case
are three academic publishers (Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, and Sage)
who argued that the unlicensed posting of digital excerpts for student access almost always
exceeded fair use and should require a license. The lower court determined that the vast majority
of the alleged infringements (or excerpts)—all but five—constituted fair use. The district court
applied the four factor fair use test (purpose and character of the use, nature of the work, amount
and substantiality of the portion used and effect on the potential market) using an arithmetic
approach, essentially weighing each factor equally and concluding that if three of the factors
favored the user, then the use was fair.
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For the appeal to the circuit court, AAUP submitted an amicus brief urging the circuit court
to affirm the district court’s ruling and to also clarify that district courts assessing fair use claims
may conduct a “transformative use” analysis to determine whether use of a copyrighted work is
fair. A “transformative use” analysis compares the purpose for which faculty use copyrighted
material in their teaching with the original purpose for which the work was intended. AAUP
argued that by making transformative use of a copyrighted work, faculty “employ the original
work in a new way in order to express new ideas, add meaning, and convey new messages,”
thereby “add[ing] to our collective knowledge and understanding.” AAUP contended that an
alternative transformative use analysis “would not primarily focus on the act of posting
copyrighted works, the format in which the works were posted, or how much was used; but, rather,
on how the works were used in teaching.” By “looking at the intended purpose of the use” courts
can determine “whether the use supplants the original work or whether, in the case of
transformative use, it creates new meanings and expresses new messages that copyright owners
have no right to monetize or prevent.” AAUP concluded that by protecting transformative uses as
non-infringing, the fair use doctrine ensures that copyright can coexist with the First Amendment’s
protection of free speech.
The circuit court did not directly address the argument put forth in the AAUP amicus brief,
however, this issue may be addressed in future cases. The circuit court reversed and remanded the
district court’s finding and determined that the district court had not properly applied the four
prong test to determine “fair use” (purpose of the new use, the nature of the original work, the
amount of the work being used, and the impact on the new use on the market for the original work).
The appellate court agreed with much of the district court’s fair use analysis, but not with how it
applied that analysis: “The District Court did err by giving each of the four fair use factors equal
weight, and by treating the four factors mechanistically. The District Court should have undertaken
a holistic analysis which carefully balanced the four factors. . .”
While agreeing that the nonprofit educational purpose of GSU’s copying supported fair
use, the appellate court expressed concern that the use was not “transformative” (e.g., a parody) in
that it achieved the same educational purpose as the original work. Because of this, the first factor
carries less weight in the overall fair use decision. The appellate court also rejected the district
court’s 10 percent or one chapter bright-line rule, and wrote “the District Court should have
performed this analysis on a work-by-work basis, taking into account whether the amount taken - qualitatively and quantitatively -- was reasonable in light of the pedagogical purpose of the use
and the threat of market substitution.”
The circuit court’s “dueling” analysis of the fair use doctrine directly impacts the
professoriate. On the one hand the appellate court espouses, “To further the purpose of copyright,
we must provide for some fair use taking of copyrighted material. But if we set this transaction
cost too high by allowing too much taking, we run the risk of eliminating the economic incentive
for the creation of original works that is at the core of copyright and -- by driving creators out of
the market -- killing the proverbial goose that laid the golden egg.” Yet, the appellate court is also
persuaded by the copyright law’s fair use protections for colleges and universities. “Congress
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devoted extensive effort to ensure that fair use would allow for educational copying under the
proper circumstances. . .” Without the presence of clear standards and ascertainable rules, faculty,
who are not experts in copyright law, will either use without deliberation of the fair use analysis
or self-censor, diminishing the value of the fair use doctrine.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2014)
In this case the Second Circuit recently ruled that various universities (collectively referred
to as “HathiTrust”) did not violate the Copyright Act of 1976 when they digitally reproduced
books, owned by the universities’ respective libraries, as the doctrine of "fair use" allowed them
to create a full-text searchable database of copyrighted works and to provide those works in
formats accessible to those with disabilities.
HathiTrust, a collection of over sixty universities worldwide including the University of
Michigan, the University of California, the University of Wisconsin, Indiana University, and
Cornell University, has agreements with Google, Inc. that permits “Google to create digital copies
of works in the Universities’ libraries in exchange for which Google provides digital copies to
[HathiTrust].” HathiTrust stores the digital copies of the works in the HathiTrust Digital Library
(HDL), which is used by its member institutions in three ways: for “(1) full-text searches; (2)
preservation; and (3) access for people with certified print disabilities.” (There is no indication
from the court’s opinion that digital copies in the HDL are used outside of the library setting for
purposes other than those enumerated.) The full-text search function allows users to conduct termbased searches across all the works in the HDL; however, where works are not in the public domain
or have not been authorized for use by the copyright owner, the term-based search only indicates
the page number on which the term appears. Digital preservation of the works in the HDL helps
member universities “preserve their collections in the face of normal deterioration during
circulation, natural disasters, or other catastrophes.” Finally, the function providing access to
print-disabled individuals, or individuals with visual disabilities, allows disabled “students to
navigate [materials] . . . just as a sighted person would.”
The plaintiffs asserted that HathiTrust’s digital reproduction of the universities’ works
constituted copyright infringement. The U.S. district court for the Southern District of New
York disagreed with this assertion. The court found that HathiTrust successfully defended its
right to use the works under the fair use exception outlined in the Copyright Act. Weighing four
factors relevant to evaluating a claim of fair use—namely, (i) the purpose and character of the
use of the works, (ii) the nature of the copyrighted works, (iii) the amount of the work copied,
and (iv) the impact on the market for or value of the works—the court held that the uses of the
works in the HDL constituted fair use and, thus, did not constitute copyright infringement.
The court found in regard to the first factor that the creation of a full-text searchable
database as a “quintessentially transformative use” because it created new uses for the books
rather than merely replicating or repackaging the books. Regarding the second and third factors,
the court found that despite the fact HDL creates and maintains copies of the works at four
different locations, these copies are reasonably necessary in order to facilitate the HDL’s
24
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss10/79
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1528

24

Nisenson: Legal Issues in Higher Education: Annual Review of Court & Admini

legitimate, transformative uses. As to the fourth factor, the court found that the full-text search
function does not serve as substitute for the books that are being searched. The HathiTrust does
not display to the user any text at all from the original work. Instead, it displays only the page
number on which the search term is found and the number of times the term appears in the work.
The Authors Guild was unable to identify any non-speculative harm to its members’ potential
market. It rejected the Authors Guild’s argument that the HathiTrust’s project could impair the
potential market for digitally licensing books for search, which could potentially develop in the
future, holding that lost licensing revenue from such a market did not count because the full-text
search did not serve as a substitute for the original books.
Further, the court acknowledged that a subset of the HDL’s collection—“previously
published non-dramatic literary works”—were specifically protected by the Chafee Amendment
to the Copyright Act. The Chafee Amendment, when read in conjunction with the Americans
with Disabilities Act, requires educational institutions to make such works available in special
formats for persons with disabilities.
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